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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between interest group political influence and allocation of decisionmaking power in 
a potentially divided government. We consider a simple endogenous policy model in which a legislator is in charge of 
setting the levels of two different policy instruments - a tax rate and a revenue redistribution scheme - and may decide 
to delegate policy authority over the allocation task to a bureaucracy within a hierarchy. An organized group is able to 
influence the political process at both tiers through the provision of policy-contingent contributions. We find conditions 
under which legislative delegation and sequential decisionmaking are consistent in equilibrium with the presence of 
two-tier lobbying, as the effects of the former on the allocation of lobbying activities exactly counterbalance the loss 
from bureaucracy's capture. As a consequence, we find that the possibility of multi-tier lobbying within a divided 
government need not be harmful to the higher level policy maker in the political equilibrium.
 
Citation: Marco Maria Sorge, (2010) ''Lobbying-consistent Delegation and Sequential Policy Making'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 30 no.4 
pp. 3088-3102. 
Submitted: Nov 08 2010.   Published: November 18, 2010. 
 
     1. Introduction
A central issue in political economy is the role of inuence-buying and nancial support
in public decisionmaking (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Olson, 1965; Bernholz, 1973;
Hillman, 1982, 1989; Hillman and Katz, 1987). Seminal contributions to the theory of
endogenous policy and rent-seeking have provided important insights into the working of
policy making processes in which organized interest groups participate actively - through
the provision of contributions to government institutions - in order to inuence policy
outcomes (e.g., Stigler, 1971; Grossman and Helpman, 1994, 2001; Dixit et al., 1997).
In this respect, the fairly large literature on endogenous policy generally neglects the
fact that government arrangements often involve multilevel governance structures. Since
public policies are likely to be the outcome of a complex process of decisionmaking at
distinct levels, there exists in principle a multiplicity of access points to the system of
government that organized interest groups can exploit for their purposes. A growing
number of empirical studies indeed documents the existence of distinct channels through
which lobbies wield pressure on political institutions and public ocials (e.g., Potters and
Sloof, 1996; Boylan, 2002). Accordingly, a comprehensive analysis of lobbying activities
calls for an evaluation of lobbies' strategic behaviour as to how best to employ resources
to impinge on the process and which choices they should attempt to aect.
This observation immediately raises the question of whether and how the costs and
benets of endowing (possibly self-interested) bureaucratic agencies with policy authority
are altered by the presence of organized groups which are able to capture the dierent
decisionmakers involved in the process. While several authors have paid attention to the
subject of policy formation in the presence of multilevel policy making (e.g., Hoyt and
Toma, 1989; Epstein and Nitzan, 2002, 2006), relatively few studies have been devoted to
the relationship between interest groups inuence over decisionmaking and the delegation
of policy authority (e.g., Spiller, 1990; Diermeier and Myerson, 1999; Sloof, 2000). In this
paper, we present a highly stylized endogenous policy model to shed some light on this
issue. The simple institutional dierences considered here assume that the preferences of
the bureaucracy closely reect those of the legislature. That is, we deliberately assume
away the scope for preference conict between government agents and the related issue of
strategic appointments. Though this certainly limits the ability of the model to capture
the actual working of political systems, a thorough analysis of these issues would require a
more complex framework accounting for nomination procedures and bargaining, which is
beyond the scope of the present work. We rather focus on the interaction between multi-
level lobbying in a divided government and the allocation of decision power when multiple
policy instruments are available. Our main result is that, under some circumstances,
legislative delegation congures an equilibrium consistent choice in the presence of two-
tier (sequential) lobbying, as the legislator will not lose from restricting it at the lower
decisionmaking tier. This obtains when the eects of delegation on strategic behaviour
of the organized interest group as to the allocation of lobbying activities are able to
counterbalance the loss from the delegate's capture - in terms of bureaucratic drift and
rent-dissipation - in which the legislator incurs.
The basic model is as follows. A legislator (`L') is in charge of setting the levels of two
dierent policy instruments, a tax rate and a revenue redistribution scheme. Since this
process is costly, it may decide to delegate policy authority over the allocation task to
1a bureaucracy (`B') within a standard principal-agent relationship. As the bureaucracy
is assumed to be appointed by the legislator itself, we let the former be concerned with
the preferences of the latter as for the eective budget allocation. More precisely, due
to career prospects in the public sector or political aliation, the political welfare func-
tion present in L's objective serves as a hierarchical constraint for B's behaviour (e.g.,
Epstein and Nitzan, 2002; Mazza and van Winden, 2008). We explicitly allow for the
possibility that an organized interest group may inuence the political process at both
decisional levels through the provision of policy-contingent contributions. When faced
with a multilevel political process, the interest group may be forced (whenever protable)
to inuence decisionmaking at each tier separately, in order to obtain its desired policy
pair. Though lobbying-provoked misbehaviour at the lower tier potentially engenders
policy bias and rent-dissipation, a countervailing eect may arise when the legislator in-
duces non-zero transfers to B via delegation, to be then fully seized within the agency
(delegation) relationship. We therefore derive precise conditions under which legislative
delegation remains a feasible equilibrium choice when two-tier lobbying and sequential
decisionmaking occur. Accordingly, legislators may well be indierent between a biased
bureaucracy and an unbiased one, when this leaves unaltered the stake of the lobby in
inuencing the process of policy making.
Closely related to our approach are the works by Spiller (1990), Sloof (2000), and
Mazza and van Winden (2008). The former develops a multiple principals agency model
to investigate the extent to which legislators could be willing to allocate policy authority
to regulators when the latter might be targeted by organized interest groups. Using a sig-
naling game, Sloof (2000) studies the interdependencies between the internal organization
of government and the choice of an organized interest group on which layer to approach
via a strategic information transmission mechanism (see also Falconieri, 2001). We con-
tribute to this literature by focusing on the interplay between sequential decisionmaking
and multi-level lobbying in a complete information endogenous policy framework. In the
same vein, Mazza and van Winden (2008) investigate multi-tier lobbying in a hierarchi-
cal government. In the monopsonistic case (i.e. when only one special interest group is
able to lobby), they nd that the reaction of the legislative agent to bureaucratic capture
is always harmful to the former and may even make lobbying wasteful for the organized
group in the political equilibrium. However, this result strictly hinges on the reduced form
hierarchical relationship between the two political bodies, which involves the absence of
any advantages from allocation of decisionmaking power between the public agents and
the net loss from lobbying at the bureaucrat's tier in which the legislator always incurs. In
this respect, our results partly restore the conventional wisdom about one-tier lobbying,
according to which lobbying proves benecial for the special interest group while policy
makers do not lose from nancial support whenever incentives exist for accepting it.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical
model, while in Section 3 the benchmark case of absence of lobbying is presented. Section
4 carries out the equilibrium analysis for the lobbying game. Section 5 concludes.
2. The model
The model mostly builds upon Mazza and van Winden (2008). We consider an economy
with a population of N individuals divided into two groups of size ni and within-group
2homogeneous preferences, with
P2
k=1 nk = N. Utility (welfare) is derived from disposable
income, which is taken to be exogenous, and redistribution of the public tax revenue:
Ui = niui; ui = (1   t)yi + hi(siR) (1)
where:
- yi denotes gross income for individuals of group i;
- t 2 T = [0;1] is the common (endogenously determined) tax rate on gross income;
- hi() is a twice-dierentiable function measuring utility derived from budget allocation





i si = 11;
- hi() is strictly increasing and concave in siR and satises limsiR!0h0
i() = 1 and
limsiR!1h0
i() = 0, i = 1;2.
A legislator (L) has the institutional role of setting the levels of the policy instruments,
i.e. the tax rate t and the budget shares si. Since policy implementation entails a cost
  > 0, the legislator may decide to delegate policy authority over the allocation task to
a bureaucrat (B) in order to gain from bureaucracy expertise and wipe out the imple-
mentation cost. The delegation process is simply modeled through a binary categorical
variable IfD;NDg which can take on two attributes only, namely IfD;NDg = D if delegation
occurs, and IfD;NDg = ND otherwise. Under delegation, public policies then result from
the sequential interplay of two government institutions at dierent decisionmaking tiers,
each enjoying full discretion over the policy instrument within its domain.
Given its interest in the political outcome, an organized interest group i may inuence
the political process by submitting policy-contingent contributions to decisionmakers, who
are supposed to be concerned with nancial support and (a political measure of) social
welfare2. Groups may exhibit dierent abilities in capturing institutions and outbidding
rival seekers of favorable policies. Here we consider the asymmetric case, where group
1 only is modeled as a transfer provider. Let C1(t;s), with s1 = s, denote the transfer
schedule which maps any feasible pair (t 2 T;s 2 S) into a non-negative contribution to
L. Under delegation, the lobby may be restricted to lobbying L for this to perform the
undelegated task only (i.e., the budget determination).








i=1 iVi(t;s)     if IfD;NDg = ND
l1C1(t) + l
P2
i=1 iVi(t;s)   HL(s) if IfD;NDg = D
(2)
l1;l; ;i > 0;
1We could think of siR as being group-specic public goods, which are produced via a linear trans-
formation function (e.g., Mazza and van Winden, 2008).
2Contribution schedules are interpreted as a measure of transferable utility, that interest groups are
able to assign to policy makers. They can be thought of as explicit incentive contracts or rather promises
of future earnings in the private sector (e.g., Bennedsen and Feldmann, 2007). Technically, we require
that the transfer functions be dierentiable for strictly positive contributions.
3In a complete information framework as the contribution game we deal with, policy makers are
plausibly concerned with lobbying expenditures and therefore with the net utility of all individuals,
lobbying or not.
3where Vi(t;s)  Ui(t;s) Ci(t;s) under no delegation and Vi(t;s)  Ui(t;s) Ci(t) Ei(s)
under delegation, with C2 = E2 = 0 by assumption and E1(s) denoting the transfer oered
by the lobbying group in order to inuence B's decision over s 2 S, given the tax rate
as predetermined by the legislator at the upper tier. In (2), l1 reects the shadow price
of lobbying L faced by the special interest group, l measures the (exogenous) degree of
preference of L for political welfare relative to contributions, and i represent the weights
the legislator attaches to net payos and stand as a measure of political relevance of group
i4. Under no delegation, feasibility of lobbying at L's tier requires (l1   l1) > 0.
Delegation may occur against the reward HL(s) in a standard (complete information)
agency relationship. While the bureaucrat can accept contributions from the lobby for
skewing the budget allocation in a certain direction, it will not discard - given the eective
size of the tax revenue R - the role of political weights on social welfare aggregation in
absence of lobbying. The relationship between the legislator, the bureaucrat and the






;  > 0 if IfD;NDg = ND
b1E1(s) + HL(s) + bl
P2
i=1 iVi; b1;b > 0 if IfD;NDg = D
(3)
where  indicates a non-zero outside opportunity for the bureaucracy, b is the weight B
attaches to L's preferences over groups' well-being, whereas b1 denotes the bias parameter
according to which lobbying at this tier proves feasible only if (b1   bl1) > 0. The
complete information optimal contract is implemented through the transfer HL(s) =  
fb1E1(s) + bl
P
i iVi(t;s)g with s 2 S denoting the optimal choice of the bureaucracy.
That is, when delegation occurs, the legislator fully seizes the benet, while lobbying at
L's tier is possible only if (l1   (1 + b)l1) > 0. The objectives (2) and (3) are taken to
be known to L, B and the organized interest group.
The delegation-lobbying game described above unfolds as follows5:
(i) the nature draws a bureaucracy B, as described by the parameters (b1;b;);
(ii) L decides over delegation of the allocation task to B; if delegation has not occurred
(i.e. IfD;NDg = ND) then: (iii) the organized interest group 1 chooses whether to lobby
L by submitting a transfer schedule C1(t;s); (iv) L selects both the tax rate t and the
budget shares (s;1   s) maximizing (2) and payos are realized;
(ii') conversely, if delegation has occurred (i.e. IfD;NDg = D) by designing an optimal
contract (H
L;s), then: (iii') at the upper decisionmaking tier the organized interest
group 1 chooses whether to lobby L by submitting a transfer schedule C1(t); (iv') L
chooses only the tax rate t maximizing (2); (v') at the lower decisionmaking tier the same
group 1 decides whether to lobby B via a transfer schedule E1(s); (vi') B chooses a budget
allocation (s;1   s) maximizing (3) and payos are realized6.
4See Coughlin et al. (1990) for an interpretation of weights on social welfare aggregation as the
outcome of electoral competition in a lobbying perspective.
5Note that we do not allow a rst-mover advantage to the lobby with respect to L's choice over
delegation of policy authority. As it will be made clear in the following, this assumption would restrict
the equilibrium strategy proles, as the organized interest group would have incentive to lobby L for
delegation versus no-delegation - being L indierent in equilibrium between the two settings - when the
shadow price of lobbying L proves higher than that of inuencing B.
6We assume, as it is typically done in the literature on endogenous policy (e.g., Grossman and Helpman,
4In the following Sections, we derive the subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the
model through backward induction.
3. Equilibrium in absence of lobbying
As a useful benchmark, we rst consider the case in which lobbying is unfeasible, i.e.
when both l1  l1 and b1  bl1 hold. Let (tnd;nl;snd;nl) denote the optimal policy pair
chosen by L when it elects not to delegate decision power over the budget allocation to
the bureaucracy ( IfD;NDg = ND), and (td;nl;sd;nl) the policies that result from delegation
(IfD;NDg = D) and sequential decisionmaking. In this case, the equilibrium policy pair
must be jointly ecient for the legislator and the bureaucracy, and it is implemented via












where w = fnd;nl;d;nlg. While the bureaucracy has aligned preferences and delegation
generates no policy bias, L must compensate the bureaucracy for its outside opportunity
 and thus the gains from trade are to be traded-o against the implementation cost  .
For the purposes of the paper, we make the subsequent:
Assumption 1. Under absence of lobbying, the parameters (b;l;i; ;) are such that:






Thus, we suppose that in the lobby free world, no advantages from delegating decision
power to the bureaucracy agency exist.
4. Two-tier lobbying and delegation choice
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal delegation choice and sequential decisionmak-
ing under lobbying. The following claim is straightforward:
Proposition 1. Let l1 > (1+b)l1 and b1  bl1. Then L is indierent between IfD;NDg =
D and IfD;NDg = ND.
Proof. - See Appendix A.
that is, allowing lobbying at the legislator's level solely does not alter the indierence
result with respect to the allocation of policy authority between L and the bureaucracy.
Intuitively, delegation involves no indirect gain for L via the agency contract, since no
additional rents would be generated at the lower level.
1994), that policies and schedules are adhered to in order to preserve the possibility of future cooperation.
7The subscripts s and t denote partial derivatives. First-order requirements fully characterize optimal
policy pairs, since Ui is concave in t and s = s1 for i = 1;2.
5Let us now focus on the case when l1 > (1 + b)l1 and b1 > bl1, this meaning that
both decisionmakers are in principle willing to trade-o welfare maximizing behaviour
with the transfers made by the lobbying group. We want to derive conditions, if any,
under which political delegation to the bureaucracy can arise in equilibrium under multi-
tier lobbying. To this end, let us assume IfD;NDg = D, then a SPE for the two-tier
lobbying subgame entails optimal policy-contribution pairs (td;l;C
d;l
1 ) and (sd;l;E
d;l
1 ), and
an optimal contract (sd;l;Hd;l) such that: (i) at each stage, the lobby acts as a principal by
submitting policy-contingent contributions to policy makers and equates at the margin the
utility loss from transfers to the benet from policy shifts they induce; (ii) sd;l maximizes
PB under the contribution E
d;l
1 , for predetermined td;l and C
d;l
1 ; (iii) td;l maximizes PL
given the contribution C
d;l
1 and the best-response function sd;l(t); (iv) legislative delegation
over the allocation task is implemented via the optimal contract (sd;l;Hd;l).
It is easy to show that, at each tier separately, the interest group may have an incentive
to lobby the decisionmaker acting at that level of the political process. More precisely,
for any pair (t;C1(t)) chosen at the legislative tier, there exist instances in which the
interest group cannot prevent itself from contributing B once the lower decisional tier has
been reached, whereas it will nd it non-detrimental to engage in lobbying behaviour at
the legislative level if also lobbies the bureaucracy. As a consequence, if delegation has
occurred, two-tier lobbying may emerge in the political equilibrium whenever feasible.
The eects of the endogenous interaction of sequential decisionmaking and lobbying
are less evident. In fact, optimal (strategic) behaviour of policy makers and the lobby
relies on the exchanges between any government tier and the interest group, which in
turn prove strongly interdependent. Since the policy switch induced by lobbying at B's
level can represent a loss for the superior L, the latter may be tempted to prevent B's
capture by either choosing not to assign the allocation task to the bureaucracy (direct
control) or limiting the scope for lobbying at that tier - through a cut in the budget R
(indirect control). On the other hand, L may also have incentive to make lobbying B
viable by making it responsible for the budget redistribution, for lobbying contributions
would then be seized within the delegation relationship. In Mazza and van Winden (2008),
the rst eect dominates insofar as the second is absent. That is, while no advantages
from government division are present under unfeasible lobbying, in the sequential game
lobbying at B's level triggers a strategic response by L which always nds itself worse
o under two-tier lobbying when compared to the no lobbying setting - in fact, both the
transfer to B and the policy change it induces represent a net loss for the legislator. A
strategic incentive for the latter then arises toward biasing its policy choice (i.e. reducing
the size of the \cake") in order to lower the stakes for political inuence over the budget
allocation process. This mechanism may in turn bring about an overall worse outcome
for the organized interest group itself, if the shift in the redistribution decision of the
bureaucracy is dominated by the legislative reaction to its capture.
Our inuence model maintains the assumption of absence of gains from multilevel
decisionmaking if political lobbying is unfeasible. Conversely, we show that giving access
to two-tier (feasible) lobbying through delegation is not harmful for the legislator, if the
marginal benet from lobbying expenditures directed to B is positive. In the following
proposition, we provide a full characterization of the equilibrium outcome of the model:
Proposition 2. Let l1 > (1 + b)l1 and b1 > bl1. Then: (i) L does not lose from two-
6tier lobbying and sequential decisionmaking if and only if b1 > (1 + b)bl1: (ii) under
delegation, the lobby makes (not simultaneously zero) oers C
d;l
1 := C1(td;l)  0 and
E
d;l
1 (td;l) := E1(sd;l(td;l))  0; (iii) L and B accept the oers and the resulting policy pair
(td;l;sd;l) is implemented.
Proof. - See Appendix B.
Thus, while the overall impact of lobbying is shaped by the strategic choices triggered
at the dierent tiers, the group's contribution leaves the upper level decisionmaker no
worse o than it would be in the absence of any nancial support. Welfare results for the
players involved in the game can be stated as follows:
Corollary 1. Let b1 > (1 + b)bl1. Then, when compared to the outcome of the no
lobbying game, the process of two-tier lobbying involves: (i) no eect on L's welfare; (ii)
no eect on B's welfare; (iii) an increase in the welfare of the lobby; (iv) a decrease in
the unorganized group's welfare.
Proof. - See Appendix C.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper studies the interaction between the allocation of lobbying activities and se-
quential policy making in a simple model of (potentially) divided government. While
two-tier lobbying can induce policy bias and rent-dissipation, it is shown that delega-
tion and sequential decisionmaking can still congure a feasible equilibrium option under
some circumstances, namely when the eects of the former on the allocation of lobbying
activities suce to counterbalance the loss arising from bureaucracy's capture. Though
it neglects several issues concerning optimal delegation and policy formation, our model
highlights the importance of further improving our understanding of multilevel governance
structures and bureaucracy decisionmaking in modern democracies, where special interest
politics is observed to be a pervasive phenomenon.
7Appendix
A. Proof of Proposition 1 - When l1 > (1 + b)l1 and b1  bl1, lobbying proves
viable at L's level solely, both under delegation and no delegation. In either case, the
lobby implements its desired policy via political contributions by making L's participation
constraint be binding at the optimum. Given Assumption 1, the legislator cannot be better
o by delegating the allocation task to the bureaucracy, as the optimizing behaviour of
the latter over the choice of the budget share s is not aected by the interest group.
Formally, let (tnd;lL;snd;lL) denote the optimal policy pair implemented by the legislator
when faced with the policy-contingent contribution schedule C1(;) oered by the lobby,
and (td;lL;sd;lL) the optimal policies under delegation to a bureaucrat that cannot be












































B. Proof of Proposition 2 - As we apply backward induction starting from the lower
tier, we assume that delegation has occurred (IfD;NDg = D) at stage 1. At the end of the
proof, we will characterize delegation as a feasible choice for the legislator on the SPE
path of the game.
Under delegation, the rst-mover advantage allows the lobby to fully seize the surplus
within its relationship with the decisionmaker acting at each tier, the latter being exactly
compensated for its failure in maximizing political welfare. At the lower tier, a policy-
contribution pair (sd;l;E
d;l
1 ) with E
d;l
1 := E1(sd;l) is thus required such that, for any (t;C1)
chosen at the upper level, the policy sd;l jointly maximizes the objectives of B and the









d;l) = 0 s:t: U1s(s
d;l)   E
d;l







d;l) = 0 (7)
8where H
d;l
L := HL(sd;l), while the contribution E
d;l
1 cannot be lowered further without
making B switch to the policy it would optimally select without any lobbying8:
E
d;l




















Under delegation, any gain from the agency relationship between L and B is seized by the
former with the reward Hw
L =  [b1E1(sw) + bl
P
i Vi(t;sw)] for any t as predetermined at
L's tier and w = fd;l;d;nlg. From (8), it may thus appear that, since any (nonnegative)
transfer E
d;l
1 could serve the purpose, the lobby would optimally set E
d;l
1 = 0. However, as
it will be proven in the following, the only case in which this zero-contribution choice will
succeed in aecting the allocation of the tax revenue obtains when the lobby can credibly
commit to submitting a unique transfer to L contingent on both the policy instruments.
Conversely, there exist conditions under which the lobby is forced to directly support the
bureaucracy for it to skew the budget allocation choice toward the desired direction. At
this stage, we can only claim that E
d;l





























1 > 0. Thus, the lobby has an incentive to contribute B at the lower deci-
sionmaking tier.
At the upper level, L considers B's best response sd;l := sd;l(t) when choosing its optimal














Lt = 0 (9)
where H
d;l
L (t) := HL(sd;l(t)) and E
d;l
1 (t) := E1(sd;l(t)) for any t 2 T. Again, the transfer
C
d;l






















where td;lB = argmaxt2T
nP
i iUi(t;sd;l)   H
d;l




denotes the tax rate








































8Note that the main eect of the lobbying activity relative to the unfeasible lobbying case is to have
the weight B grants the lobby's marginal utility increased (since b1 > bl1). Given concavity assumption,
lobbying indeed enhances its budget share (i.e. sd;l > sd;nl).
9From the denitions of td;l and td;lB we obtain9 C
d;l














Therefore, lobbying at the legislative tier is non-detrimental for the organized interest
group even when the latter also lobbies the bureaucracy.
Finally, we need to show that that IfD;NDg = D can represent an equilibrium choice for
L. To reduce notation, let us exploit the following denitions:

 := (l1   (1 + b)l1); 	 := (b1   (1 + b)l1)














where (tnd;l;snd;l)  (tnd;lL;snd;lL) since no delegation involves absence of the bureaucracy's























































By adding and subtracting (1 + b)l
P
i iUi(td;lB;sd;nl), and from the denitions of td;nl
and sd;nl 2 argmaxs2S fHL(s) + bl
P
i iUi(s)g, the left-hand side of this inequality turns
strictly positive; since E
d;l

















that is, delegation is not excluded from the equilibrium strategy prole of the game if and
only if the marginal eect on L's welfare of lobbying at B's tier is strictly positive (i.e.
	 > 0) and the contribution received by the bureaucracy when lobbying at the legislator's
tier is unfeasible, is not lower than a given (strictly positive) threshold. Under full seizing,
this threshold coincides with the maximum transfer the organized interest group is willing
9Strict inequalities result when td;l 6= td;lB.




















where Vi(td;lB;sd;l)  Ui(td;lB;sd;l)   E1(td;lB;sd;lB)10. Indeed, in this case the transfer to
B is strictly positive and contingent on both the policies as this is the only avenue the
lobby can exploit in order to achieve the desired outcome. To complete the proof, we
thus have to show under what conditions the lobby makes strictly positive contributions
to either of the policymakers. When delegation occurs under feasible two-tier lobbying,
L's objective can be expressed as:
PL = 
C1(t) + 	E1(s) + (1 + b)l
2 X
i=1








l1U1t(td;l;sd;l) + (1 + b)l2U2t(td;l;sd;l) = 0
b1U1s(td;l;sd;l) + (1 + b)l2U2s(td;l;sd;l) = 0
(17)
Depending on whether 
 T 	, the interest group could thus simultaneously condition
the contribution to L or B on the policies of L and B, according to the magnitude of
the lobbying shadow prices l1 and b1. Precisely, when 
 > 	 (i.e. l1 > b1) the lobby
will optimally choose not to submit any contribution to the lower-tier policy maker, still
succeeding in inducing policy bias in the budget allocation as determined at B's level by
making the transfer to the superior legislator contingent on both t and s. Conversely,
when 
 < 	 (i.e. l1 < b1), only the bureaucracy will be lobbied via a strictly positive
contribution, again conditioned on both the policy instruments11. Finally, when 
 = 	
































will serve the purpose. In this nal case, strictly positive transfers to both the policy
makers can occur.
10Note that the proof of Proposition 2 rests on the assumption that l1 > (1 + b)l1. One further
possibility is that lobbying at L's tier is possible under no delegation but unfeasible under delegation,
which occurs when l1 < l1 < (1+b)l1. In this case, the legislator would still be indierent between not
delegating and delegating, since the interest group would seize all the surplus from the lobbying activity.
11It is indeed straightforward, by exploiting the denition of the optimal delegation contract, to show
that in either case optimal policies are implicitly dened by equation (17). Details are available upon
request.
11C. Proof of Corollary 1 - Points (i) and (ii) readily follow from Proposition 2 and


















. According to the
proof of Proposition 2, we have the following three cases:
(I) b1 > l1: in this case the contributions to the policy makers take the form:
C
d;l
















By substituting these relations back into (18), we see that the lobby's welfare will improve


















which follows immediately from (17);
(II) l1 > b1: same as the previous case, with C
d;l
1  Cd;l(td;l;sd;l) > 0 and E
d;l
1 = 0, and l1
(resp. 
) replacing b1 (resp. 	);













, for (td;l;sd;l) as dened above.
Finally, we demonstrate point (iv) of the Corollary. Owing to Proposition 2, let 	 > 0,
then PL(td;nl;sd;nl) = PL(td;l;sd;l) obtains. Since group 1 always prots from lobbying, the




























for the described cases (I), (II) and (III), all derived under the requirement that 	 > 0.
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